19 October 2014
This report synthesizes findings of evaluations conducted between July 2013 and July 2014, covering 12 operations with a combined planned value of USD 3 billion (totaling over USD 1.7 billion funded), which targeted 14.3 million beneficiaries a year, were of varying types, durations and sizes and implemented in diverse settings.
The evaluations found all operations cohered well with national and sector policy frameworks. WFP is directly influencing policy and strategy formulation, and increasingly engaging in joint programming. WFP delivered broadly relevant food assistance, with most operations appropriate to overall needs; however, insufficient differentiation in the analysis and planning of some operations compromised planning for specific beneficiary needs. Results were inadequately documented, particularly at the outcome level, mainly because of weak monitoring systems. Evaluations revealed that the full extent of WFP’s achievements – and under-achievements – is not currently reflected in reporting systems. General food distribution, school feeding and nutrition activities delivered well against coverage targets, with weaker performance in food assistance for assets. Evidence found that WFP served beneficiaries with less food than planned, however. Gender sensitivity was limited.
At the outcome level, WFP made most progress under Strategic Objective (SO) 1 - saving lives. Only limited data were available on SO2 (preventing acute hunger and investing in disaster preparedness and mitigation) and SO5 (capacity-development). Assessment of efficiency and sustainability was shallow; few operations were characterized as generally efficient or potentially sustainable.
External factors affecting results include WFP’s complex operating terrain and funding. Internal factors are symptomatic of an organization in transition, progressing in introducing changes, but with business processes needing to adapt. The lessons presented in this synthesis report aim to support WFP as it becomes increasingly fit for purpose.
28 March 2014
This evaluation of WFP’s 2008 cash and voucher policy was commissioned by the Office of Evaluation in order to assess the quality and results of the policy and its implementation.
The evaluation found that although the policy does not represent WFP’s current best practice for policies, it served its purpose in establishing the basis for authorizing use of cash transfers and vouchers within WFP’s mandate. However, the intended outcomes of the policy — such as empowerment of beneficiaries, improved livelihoods and better coping strategies — were not measured systematically, and the lack of disaggregation by modality at project level in the corporate monitoring system makes it impossible to attribute achievement of corporate outcomes or outputs to modality, be it cash, vouchers or in-kind food. Other expected outcomes from the policy were related to efficiency gains in the business process, which were found to have had mixed results, with some key bottlenecks causing significant delays.
Among key recommendations are updating revised manuals and guidance, rather than updating the policy. Furthermore it recommends that WFP invest in capacity development, identify and empower leadership on cash transfers and vouchers, and build evidence to clarify its value proposition to its external partners.
5 June 2012
The Annual Evaluation Report for 2011 focuses on lessons arising from implementation to date of WFP’s Strategic Plan 2008-2013. It covers 16 evaluations on: strategic themes in the transition from ‘food aid to food assistance’, such as partnerships and how Country Offices adapt to change; school feeding and WFP support to agricultural small holders and markets; and WFP’s strategic positioning and performance in Haiti, Kenya, Rwanda and Yemen; and others.
17 February 2012
The Niger portfolio evaluation covers seven WFP operations and analytical work between 2007 and 2011. The portfolio contains three distinct implementing phases, and the evaluation findings show that WFP teams in Niger successfully negotiated each of the three phases with appropriate responses strategies.
During the first phase the CO was clearly restrained in its programming choices and favoured activities that did not generate hostility from the Government of Niger in place until the coup d’état in 2010. The CO responded rapidly and effectively to the 2010 food crises during the second phase. In 2011 WFP Niger could start implementing several changes as this third phase was the first unconstrained year without a major food crisis and with a constructive relationship with the Government of Niger.
- 27 February 2015 WFP Stands By Nigerian Refugees Despite Growing Insecurity
- 10 February 2015 Nigeria Violence Drives Thousands Into Niger
- 9 February 2015 WFP Alarmed at Spread of Violence Into Niger (For the Media)
- 15 October 2014 WFP And The EU: Pushing For Zero Hunger Together